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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
J. DAVID VIGOS
Applicant/Petitioner,
v.

*

Case No. 96-0283-CA

MOUNTAINLAND BUILDERS, INC.,
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF
UTAH, and the INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH

*

Priority No. 7

Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
There has not been an evidentiary hearing in this case
before the Industrial Commission, but the facts of the case
pertaining to the statute of limitation issue are essentially not
in dispute and this case warrants a summary disposition without
the necessity of oral argument.

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this Appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-82.53(2)(1994), § 63-46b-16
(1993) and § 78-2a-3(2)(a)(1992 & Supp.1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Does the Industrial Commission require a social

security disability award before an application for hearing for
workers' compensation permanent total disability can be filed?

B.

Is the Petitioner's claim for workers' compensation

permanent total disability barred by the six year statute of
limitation found in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988)?
C.

Is the six year period of time allowed for filing an

application for hearing with the Industrial Commission a statute
of limitation or a statute of repose?
D.

Does the continuing jurisdiction of the Industrial

Commission under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1)(1988)have any impact
upon the statute of limitation periods set forth in § 35-1-99(3)
in light of the restrictive language contained in § 35-178 (3) (a) M b ) (1988) ?
E.

Does the general doctrine of "equitable tolling" of

statutes of limitations apply to workers' compensation permanent
total disability if an applicant has filed for social security
disability?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Standard of Review to be applied in the review of all
issues outlined above is the Correction of Error Standard. The
Court is to review the administrative agency's Conclusions of Law
without deference to determine whether the agency has erroneously
interpreted or applied the law.1

1

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d); Morton International v.
Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Commission, 814, P.2d 581
(Utah 1991); Moreflow Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328
(Utah App. 1991).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(1) (1988) (subsequently amended) .
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1988)(subsequently amended).
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-98(2) (1994) .
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988) (repealed 1990) .
Utah Administrative Rule R563-1-17 (1995) .
The complete text to the statutory provisions and rules can
be found in Addendum C.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

On October 13, 1988, the Petitioner, J. David Vigos, fell
and sustained injuries to his head and back while working for
Mountainland Builders, Inc. (R.l) Compensation and medical bills
were paid through May 8, 198 9. (R.39) No ratings were ever given
by any of the Petitioner's treating physicians for any residual
impairment and he was released to work without restrictions on
May 8, 198 9, although some precautions were recommended for a
period of time. (R.207,226) On July 11, 1995 the Petitioner filed
an application for hearing for workers' compensation permanent
total disability benefits. (R.13) The essential issue in this
case is whether the six year statute of limitation for permanent
total disability found in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988) bars
the Petitioner's claim.
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B.

Course of Proceedings.

After the Petitioner filed his Application for Hearing with
the Industrial Commission, the Defendants/Respondents filed an
Answer asserting the Petitioner's claim was barred under the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988), and moved the
Industrial Commission for a dismissal of the Petitioner's claim
with prejudice as a matter of law. On August 21, 1995, the
administrative law judge advised counsel for the Petitioner that
he had 15 days within which to respond to Respondents' Motion to
Dismiss. The Petitioner filed his Memorandum in Opposition to
Dismiss on September 5, 1995. An Order of Dismissal was entered
by the administrative law judge on September 18, 1995 based upon
the Petitioner's failure to file his claim within six years after
his industrial accident of October 13, 1988 as required by Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3).

(Addendum A.) The Petitioner filed his

Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission on October 16,
1995 to which the Defendants/Respondents responded on October 27,
1995.
C.

Disposition in Trial Court or Agency.

On March 28, 1996, the Industrial Commission entered its
Order denying the Petitioner's Motion for Review based upon the
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-98(2), because the
Petitioner had failed to file his Application for Hearing with
the Industrial Commission within six years from the date of his
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accident.2 (Addendum B.) The Industrial Commission found the
Petitioner's arguments unpersuasive and further found the
Appellate decisions cited to be of no precedential value because
they were decided under former case law. As to jurisdiction, the
Industrial Commission found the argument with respect to
continuing jurisdiction to be inapplicable because such
continuing jurisdiction attaches only after a timely application
for benefits has been filed. The Industrial Commission further
found that the time for filing the Petitioner's claim with the
Industrial Commission was not "equitably tolled" while he pursued
Social Security disability compensation because that principle
has not been accepted before in Utah and, furthermore, it is
directly contrary to the provisions of the statute.
D.

Statement of Facts.

The Petitioner, David Vigos, was employed by Mountainland
Builders, Inc., as a carpenter. On his third day of employment,
the plank he was standing on broke causing him to fall to the
floor below injuring his head and back. (R.l) The Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah, Mountainland Builders' insurance
carrier, (the Respondents) paid medical expenses through July of
1989 and temporary total disability benefits from October 14,
1988 to May 8, 1989. (R.39) The Petitioner was released to return
to work on May 8, 1989 without restrictions. (R.207) The

2

The language in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-98(2) (1994) is
essentially the same as the language of § 35-1-99(3) (1988)
(repealed 1990) , the provision effective at the time of the
Petitioner's industrial accident.
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Petitioner was seen by Dr. David G. Ericksen, a Clinical
Psychologist, for a neuropsychological evaluation on December 14,
15, 8c 16, 1988. (R.222-226) Dr. Ericksen reported that, "while
his areas of impairment may, at least temporarily, limit his
ability to function at the same level of intensity, speed, and
acuity to which he was previously accustomed, he clearly
continues to be a very bright, capable man, with many options for
employment and enjoyable leisure pursuits." (R.225) Dr. Ericksen
further recommended that the Petitioner " [n]ot place himself in a
position to be responsible for large-scale development projects,
for approximately 12 months following his injury... [h]e would be
well advised to pursue a somewhat more slow pace, structured line
of work, where he can go at his own mental and physical pace, and
increase his load and responsibility as appropriate." (R.226)
The Petitioner sought no further treatment from May 8, 1989
to sometime in 1994 except, perhaps, for his assertion that he
had been to a chiropractor on Redwood Road at some unspecified
time. (R.114)
On January 25, 1994, the Petitioner applied for Social
Security disability benefits. (R.24) On October 25, 1994, the
Petitioner called Michael Bordiga, a claims adjuster for the
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, indicating that he was
experiencing increasing problems in his back and neck. (R.114) He
was advised of the three year statute of limitation with respect
to medical expenses. (R.114) On November 3, 1994, Petitioner was
notified by letter from the claims adjuster that his request for

-6-

ongoing medical treatment was being denied based on the
provisions of § 35-1-98 of the Workers' Compensation Act. (R.115)
The Petitioner was awarded Social Security disability
benefits on June 23, 1995 effective as of January 1, 1993.
(R.23-25) The Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing form
with the Industrial Commission on July 11, 1995 seeking payment
for medical expenses, travel expenses, temporary total disability
compensation and permanent total disability compensation. (R.13)
The Defendants/Respondents moved for an Order dismissing the
Petitioner's claim because it was not filed within six years
after the date of his injury as required under the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3). (R.39) On September 18, 1995, the
administrative law judge granted the Defendants/Respondents'
Motion and dismissed the Petitioner's claim with prejudice.
(Addendum A.) The Order of Dismissal was affirmed by the
Industrial Commission on March 28, 1996. (Addendum B.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Industrial Commission does not require a disability
award from the Social Security Administration (SSA) prior to
filing an application for hearing for permanent total disability
and does not dismiss applications because this information is not
provided. The Petitioner provides no credible evidence that this
is the Industrial Commission's practice. The Application for
Hearing form states that information on a SSA disability award
must be provided with the application i£ the applicant has a SSA
-7-

disability award. The workers' compensation statute and
Industrial Commission's rules require the Industrial Commission
to use the same SSA decision making process SSA uses to determine
disability. The workers' compensation statute and rules do not
require a SSA disability award prior to filing an application for
hearing for a permanent total disability claim.
The permanent total disability statute of limitation
clearly and unequivocally states that an application for hearing
must be filed within six years of the industrial accident for
claims for permanent total disability. This statute of limitation
is not a statute of repose in violation of the open courts
provision of the Utah Constitution. The Petitioner's cause of
action arose on the date of his industrial accident and he had
six years in which to file a permanent total disability claim.
The Petitioner provides no credible reason to toll the statute of
limitation in this case. The continuing jurisdiction of the
Industrial Commission does not give it the authority to change or
ignore statutes of limitations for workers' compensation
benefits.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DOES NOT REQUIRE A SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY AWARD BEFORE AN APPLICATION FOR HEARING FOR
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY CAN BE
FILED.
A*

The Industrial Commission Does Not Dismiss a Permanent
Total Disability Claim Because A Claimant Does Not Have
A Social Security Disability Award.

An injured employee does not need a disability award from
the Social Security Administration (SSA) prior to filing a
workers' compensation claim for permanent total disability. The
Petitioner states that "if a claimant does not have a social
security award, then the Industrial Commission will dismiss a
claim without prejudice because the applicant does not meet the
statutory elements necessary to prove an injury by accident."
(Petitioner's Brief, p.18.) The Petitioner provides no evidence
that this is the practice of the Industrial Commission. Instead
the Petitioner pieces together a memo and letters from the
Industrial Commission to create a procedure that does not exist.
The Petitioner points to a memorandum from Administrative
Law Judge Timothy C. Allen to Marge Mele dated January 31, 1994.
(Petitioner's Brief, p.18.) This memorandum clarifies "what
evidence from Social Security (SSA) is needed to establish a
prima facie case of permanent total disability for injuries
occurring on or after July 1, 1988." (R.80) Contrary to the
Petitioner's assertion, this memorandum does not say that all
applications for hearing will be returned without a SSA
disability award. Nor does it establish that a SSA disability
-9-

award is a statutory element for a permanent total disability
claim. It simply outlines the evidence an injured employee needs
to establish a prima

facie

case for a permanent total disability

claim, i.e. a Notice of Award and a Disability Determination and
Transmittal or Decision from SSA must be provided, if available.
Furthermore, the information on the back of the Application
for Hearing form indicates that a SSA disability award is not an
absolute requirement. The back of the form lists the documents
which must accompany the form; this list includes " in permanent
total disability claims only, copy of Social Security Award
Certificate, Decision of Administrative Law Judge or Appeals
Council and/or Disability Determination and Transmittal Sheet
(form SSA 831-U5), i£ Social Security total disability has been
awarded." (R.13)(Emphasis added.) This directly contradicts the
Petitioner's assertion that a SSA disability award is required
before an application for hearing is filed. SSA disability award
information is only required if an award has been made.
The Petitioner states on page 18 of his brief that
" [p]ursuant to the Industrial Commission rules, an applicant must
include a "notice of award and a disability determination and
transmittal or decision from the Social Security Administration
when filing a claim for permanent total disability.'"
(Incorrectly quoting Judge Allen's January 31, 1994 memorandum.)
(Emphasis in Petitioner's Brief.) Further, the Petitioner states
that "[i]f this is not done then the Industrial Commission will
return the application to the applicant [and] [e]ventually, if
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the applicant has not submitted the required information, then
the case will be dismissed without prejudice." The Petitioner
cites Judge Allen's January 31, 1994 memorandum and the Bradley
case to support these assertions. In doing so, the Petitioner
misleads this Court by failing to provide the complete facts in
Bradley so that this Court can evaluate its relevance to this
case. In any event, Bradley has no precedential value.
Judge Allen's January 31,1994 memorandum is not a rule, it
is an inter-office memorandum. The Industrial Commission's
practices and procedures and all the relevant facts in the
Bradley case are addressed in the Industrial Commission's brief.
Mr. Bradley's Application for Hearing form was not returned for
non-compliance with Judge Allen's memorandum but for failure to
comply with the revised Application for Hearing procedures then
in effect, as explained in the Industrial Commission's brief.
B.

The Petitioner Had No Knowledge Of And Was Not
Prejudiced By The Industrial Commission's Alleged
Procedure Of Requiring A SSA Disability Award Before
Filing An Application For Hearing.

Even if the Industrial Commission's procedures were to
require a SSA disability award before an application for hearing
could be filed, it would be of no consequence to the Petitioner.
The Petitioner provides no evidence that he was aware of this
alleged procedure for filing a permanent total disability claim
and did not file an application for hearing because of this
alleged procedure. The Petitioner provides no evidence that he
was prejudiced by this alleged procedure in any way. It is likely
that the Petitioner was informed of the alleged procedure by his

current attorney after the statute of limitation had already
run.3

POINT II.
THE PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY IS
BARRED BECAUSE HE DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENT OF FILING .AN APPLICATION FOR HEARING WITHIN SIX
YEARS OF HIS ACCIDENT.
A.

Section 35-1-99(3) Sets Forth In Clear And Unequivocal
Terms What Is Required For Permanent Total Disability
Claims.

Under the plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3)(1988)
the Petitioner was required to file an application for hearing
within six years of the accident. Questions of statutory
construction are resolved by first looking at the plain language
of the statute. CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n.,
897 P. 2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995) . The assumption is made that
statutory terms are used advisedly and thus should be read
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or
inoperable. K & T. Inc. V. Korolis. 888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah
1994) .
Section 35-1-99(3) states that " a claim for compensation
for . . . permanent total disability benefits is wholly barred,
unless an application for hearing is filed with the Industrial

3

The Affidavit of the Petitioner's attorney, Eugene C.
Miller, states " [o] n Novembei: 3, 1994 the applicant came to my
office because the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah denied Mr.
Vigos' request for additional medical benefits. Prior to that
time I had not represented Mr. Vigos in his industrial claim."
(R.99-100) It should also be noted that Mr. Miller was the
attorney in the Bradley case. (R.82)
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Commission within six years after the date of the accident."
Utah Code Ann. 35-1-99(3)(1988). The Petitioner argues that the
term "accident" should include the date he could no longer work
because an injured employee cannot apply for workers'
compensation permanent total disability benefits until he has a
SSA disability award. (Petitioner Brief, p.13-14.) This
conclusion is based on the Petitioner's interpretation of the
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(1) (1988) which states that " [p]ermanent
total disability . . . requires a finding by the commission of
total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulation as revised."
(R.13-18)
The Petitioner's interpretation of § 35-1-67(1) is
inaccurate. The plain language of this section states that the
Industrial Commission will follow the sequential decision-making
process of the Social Security Administration (SSA) to make a
finding of total disability. There is nothing confusing or
misleading about the language in § 35-1-67(1). There is no
requirement that an injured employee must be found disabled by
the SSA before filing a workers' compensation claim for permanent
total disability.4 The Industrial Commission is merely required
to use the SSA disability decision making process.

4

Not all workers' compensation permanent total disability
claimants qualify for SSA disability benefits. For example, an
injured employee who is 65 or over would not be able to get
social security disability benefits, only retirement benefits.
-13-

This conclusion is consistent with the administrative rules
promulgated by the Industrial Commission regarding permanent
total disability claims. Utah Administrative Rule R568-1-17B
states that "[i]n the event that the Social Security
Administration or its designee has made, or is in the process of
making, a determination of disability under the foregoing
process, the Commission may use this information in lieu of
instituting the process on its own behalf." This section
recognizes that a claim for permanent total disability may be
made without filing for SSA disability (the language "in the
event") . It also recognizes that a SSA decision on disability is
not required before filing (the language "or is in the process of
making") . Finally, the Commission is not required to use the
information from SSA but "may use this information in lieu of
instituting the process on its own behalf." (Emphasis added.)
In addition, Subsection D. states that "[t]o make a
tentative finding of permanent total disability the Commission
incorporates the rules of disability determination in 20 CFR
404.1520 . . . the sequential decision making process referred to
requires a series of questions and evaluations to be made in
sequence . . . ." Utah Admin. R568-1-17D(1995). This indicates
that the Industrial Commission is to use the same decision making
process used by SSA. It does not state, nor does it imply that a
SSA disability award is needed before an applicant can file for
workers' compensation permanent total disability benefits.
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In conclusion, both § 35-1-67(1) and R568-1-17 confirm that
the statutory relationship between workers' compensation
permanent total disability benefits and SSA disability benefits
is limited to the requirement that the Industrial Commission use
the SSA decision making process to determine disability. These
provisions do not support the Petitioner's claim that the statute
and the rules require a SSA disability award prior to filing an
application for hearing for permanent total disability.5
B.

The Statute Of Limitation Began To Run October 13,
1988, The Date Of The Petitioner's Industrial Accident.
The Petitioner's Reasons For Tolling The Statute Of
Limitations Are Without Merit.

Section 35-1-99(3)states that the application for hearing
must be filed within six years of the date of the accident. The
term "accident" is not defined in the statute. In Allen v.
Industrial Comm'n., 729 P.2d 15, 22 (Utah 1986) "accident" was
defined as "an unexpected or unintended occurrence that may
either be the cause of or the result of an injury." The
unexpected or unintended occurrence was the Petitioner's fall on
a construction site on October 13, 1988. This fall caused the
Petitioner's injuries. The Petitioner's cause of action for a
permanent total disability claim accrued on October 13, 1988 as
this is the date he was injured.
This determination is consistent with the decisions in Avis
v. Board of Review of the Industrial Comm'n., 837 P.2d 584 (Utah

5

The argument that the Industrial Commission's procedure is
to require a SSA disability award before filing is also without
merit. See Point I.
-15-

App. 1992) and Middlestadt v. Industrial Comm'n., 852 P.2d 1012
(Utah App. 1993). In Avis, the employee's claim for permanent
partial disability due to a back injury was denied per § 35-1-99.
The court concluded that the employee's cause of action accrues
when the accident occurred, stating:
The petitioner knew of his injury on July 4, 1968 [the date
he injured his back due to a motorcycle accident]. He
received medical treatment for his injury and was aware of
recurring back pain over a period of several years.
Therefore, even though petitioner did not seek a disability
rating or file a compensation claim until twenty-two years
after his accident, he knew of the injury and could have
filed for compensation within the statutory period.
Petitioner seeks a rule which would postpone running of the
statute until he "discovered" the full extent of his injury.
The workers' compensation statute, however, does not require
stabilization before filing for benefits.
Id. at 588. See also, Middlestadt v. Ind. Comm'n., 852 P.2d 1012
(Utah App. 1993)(adopting the Avis conclusion and rejecting the
argument that the statute of limitation is tolled until the
claimant discovers the full extent of his injury.)
Likewise, in the instant case the statute of limitation
should not be tolled until the Petitioner was no longer able to
work. The Petitioner's injuries were apparent on the date of
accident. He received medical treatment and temporary total
disability payments for this injury. The Petitioner apparently
had continuing problems during the six year limitation period. He
filed for SSA disability benefits on January 24, 1994, well
within the six year statutory period. SSA found he was unable to
work after January 1, 1993. Thus, the Petitioner knew of his
injury and disability, and could have filed an application for
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hearing for permanent total disability within the six year
period.
The Petitioner argues that he was not aware of his right to
file an application for hearing for permanent total disability
benefits. In Avis. the court stated that "mere ignorance of the
existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running of
the statute of limitation." Id. at 587-88 (citation omitted).
The Petitioner also suggests that the Respondents neglected
to inform him of his right to file a hearing until after the
statute of limitation barred him from doing so. (Petitioner's
Brief, p.3 0.) A review of the record indicates that the
Petitioner never requested payment of disability benefits. The
last medical expense payment made by the Respondents was in July
of 1989. (R.39) The three year statute of limitation on the
Petitioner's medical expenses ran in July of 1992.6 The
Respondent's claim file shows no contact with the Petitioner
between November, 1989 and October, 1994. (R.114) On October 25,
19 94 the following computer log was made regarding a phone
conversation with the Petitioner on that date:
Claimant called to state that he has been experiencing
increasing problems in his low, mid and upper back and neck.
He stated that it is related to his original industrial
injury. He cannot remember when he had treatment last
although he explained that he saw a chiropractor on Redwood
Road who apparently didn't understand his problem and
worsened his condition. He couldn't state when this
occurred, but it seemed that it may have been some time ago.

6

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(2) (1988) (repealed 1990) imposed a
three year limitation period for medical expenses. Three year
statute of limitation is currently found in § 35-1-98(1).
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He is currently employed in his own business called Wild
West Enterprises, which, according to the claimant, finds
work for other people. His pager is #535-3015 and his home
number is #272-7770. He states that his worsening condition
has made it impossible at times to work. I explained that we
would retrieve his claim from archives and evaluate. He
wants to go to his original chiropractor, Dr. Craig Buhler.
I also explained the three year treatment rule.
(R.114)
The Respondents' records show that the Petitioner first
contacted them regarding additional medical expenses 2 years
after the statute of limitation for medical expenses had passed.
The Petitioner said nothing about being unable to work. In fact,
he said he was currently employed in his own business. The
Respondent's November 3, 1994 letter notifying the Petitioner
that he had a right to a hearing was regarding the medical
expenses statute of limitation because that is what was discussed
in the October 25, 1994 conversation. There was never any
discussion regarding the statute of limitation for disability
claims.
The Petitioner claims he contacted the Respondents at least
50 times, and spoke to the claims adjuster at least a dozen times
starting about a year after his release. (R.lll) The Petitioner
was released for work on May 8, 1989. (R.207) Thus, the
Petitioner maintains that since mid 1990 he tried to get the
Respondents to pay additional medical treatment, yet the only
record of these attempts is one computer log made on October 25,
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1994 - two years after the statute of limitation for medical
expenses had expired.7
The Petitioner is a highly educated business man. He has a
Ph.D in higher education/management science and has taught at the
University of Utah in the Management Department and at
Westminster College. (R.222) He has been involved in highintensity, high-stake business dealings in the past. (R.226) As
recently as October 1994 he had his own business. (R.114) The
Petitioner also retained counsel to represent him at his social
security disability proceedings where evidence of his industrial
injury was presented. (R.30,33) The Petitioner had ample
opportunity to investigate his rights under workers' compensation
laws and file an application for hearing for permanent total
disability within the six year period.
The Petitioner cites the treatise Workmens' Compensation
Law, by Arther Larson to support the tolling of the statute of
limitations. However Larson was criticizing jurisdictions with
short periods of limitation. The scenario described in § 78.42
(a) of 2B Larson, Workmens' Compensation Law referred to by
Petitioner has no application in the instant case. In that case,
the Applicant had been struck in the eye by a metal chip. The
injury had been dismissed by the company doctors as a petty
accident with no present injury or disability.

7

Eighteen months

The claims adjuster recalled speaking to the Petitioner two
to three times, although he did not recall whether it was before
or after the October 25, 1994 conversation. (R.114)
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later, a cataract developed and Applicant was denied a remedy
because the statute in that jurisdiction barred claims filed more
than one year after the accident. The harshness of a one year
statute of limitations was obvious in that case because the
worker could not claim compensation during the year because he
had no compensable injury and he could not claim compensation
after the year because the statute had run. That case is totally
dissimilar to the instant case. The Petitioner sustained a
compensable injury and was compensated for such. The Petitioner
had six years from the date of his accident to claim permanent
total disability, but failed to file an application for hearing
even though he knew, or should have known long before the filing
deadline expired, that he might have a claim for permanent total
disability.
C.

The 1988 Changes In The Statute Of Limitation
Provisions Clarified The Procedures For Filing A Claim
For Permanent Total Disability.

Prior to 1988, Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-99 and 35-1-100
addressed the statutes of limitations for workers1 compensation
claims. Claims for compensation were barred unless filed within
three years after the date of accident or the date of last
payment of compensation. Neither section provided a statute of
limitation specifically for permanent total disability claims. In
fact, in Mecham v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah
1984) the court determined that the applicant could file her
petition for permanent total disability at any time so long as
her disability arose from the original injury because she had
-20-

given notice during the three year limitation period found in
section 35-1-99.
The statute of limitation prior to 1988 was also vague as to
what a claimant must do to toll the statute of limitation.
Section 35-1-99(1987) stated that "if no claim for compensation
is filed with the industrial commission within three years . . .
the right to compensation shall be barred." Section 35-1-100
indicated the claimant must "file with the commission in writing
notice of such accident. . ."In Utah State Insurance Fund v.
Dutson. 646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court
addresses the notice provisions of §§35-1-99 & 35-1-100. The
Court acknowledged that a claim for compensation did not need to
"bear any particular formality," finding that it "need only give
notice to the parties and to the commission of the material facts
on which the right asserted is to depend." Id. at 709 (citations
omitted). However, contrary to the Petitioner's assertion, Dutson
is not applicable to this case because it interprets statutory
provisions not in effect at the time of the Petitioner's injury.
In 1988, section 35-1-99 was revised to clarify the statute
of limitation for workers' compensation benefits. Subsection 351-99(3) was added which specifically addressed permanent total
disability claims. This subsection barred permanent total
disability claims "unless an application for a hearing is filed
with the Industrial Commission within six years of the date of
the accident." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988). Thus, the
legislature, likely as a result of the above two cases, added a
-21-

statute of limitation for permanent total disability claims and
unequivocally outlined what an injured employee must do to claim
permanent total disability. The language in § 35-1-99(3) is not
ambiguous, confusing or inoperable. The Industrial Commission
must have notice that an injured employee wants a hearing for
permanent total disability within six years of the employees'
industrial accident.
In conclusion, the Petitioner's claim for permanent total
disability is barred because he did not file an application for
hearing within six years of the date of his industrial accident.
Neither the statute or administrative rules require a SSA
disability award before a permanent total disability claim can be
filed. The Petitioner was aware of his injury and his inability
to work during the six year period and could have filed an
application for hearing during the six years.
POINT III.
THE SIX YEAR LIMITATION FOR FILING FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS IS NOT A STATUTE OF
REPOSE VIOLATING THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION IN THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
The six year limitation on permanent total disability claims
applicable at the time of the Petitioner's industrial injury is a
statute of limitation not a statute of repose. Utah Courts have
distinguished statutes of limitations from statutes of repose. A
statute of repose begins to run from a date or event independent
and unrelated to the date of legal injury. Selvage v. J.J.
Johnson & Assoc., 910 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Utah App. 1996) . A statute
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of limitation does not begin to run until the cause of action has
accrued. Id.
Statutes of repose violate the open courts provision of
Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.8 Statutes of
limitation do not. Statute of limitations promote justice by
"preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories
have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Avis v. Bd. Of
Review of Ind. Comm'n.. 837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1992).
Statute of limitations are presumptively constitutional. Id.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) states "[a] claim for
compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary
partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability
benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is wholly
barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the
Industrial Commission within six years after the date of the
accident." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988). This statute is
not a statute of repose. It does not begin to run from a date or
event independent and unrelated to the date of legal injury.
Rather, it runs from the date of the legal injury - the date of
the industrial accident. The Petitioner's cause of action for

Art I. § 11 states "All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall
be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any
tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to
which he is a party."
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workers' compensation benefits arose on the date of his
industrial injury on October 13, 1988. There was no dispute as to
whether the Petitioner was injured. The Petitioner's medical
expenses were paid as were temporary total disability benefits.
On two occasions this court has decided that workers'
compensation statutes of limitations are not statutes of repose
just because an injured employee did not discover the full extent
of his injuries within the limitation period. In Avis, a claimant
filed for permanent partial disability benefits after the statute
of limitation period in § 35-1-99 expired, arguing that he could
not file his claim for disability benefits until he received a
disability rating. The court rejected the claimant's argument
that the statute of limitation should be tolled until the
claimant "discovered" the full extent of his injury. Id. at 588.
The court determined that section 35-1-99 did not violate the
open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.9
Similarly, in Middlestadt v. Industrial Comm'n.. 852 P.2d
1012 (Utah App. 1993) the claimant filed for additional
disability benefits after the eight year limitation period for
benefits found in Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-65 and 35-1-66 (1977).
The court, following Avis, stated that "a workers' cause of
action accrues when the industrial accident occurs. A statute

9

At the time section 35-1-99 imposed a three year statute
of limitation on filing a claim. The court was asked to declare
that version and the 1988 version (the version applicable to this
case) unconstitutional. The court stated that "our ruling on the
earlier statute's constitutionality renders this point moot."
Avis, 837 P.2d at 586.
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requiring filing within a set period following the accident is
therefore a statute of limitation not a statute of repose." Id.
at 1013 (citations omitted). The court determined that if the
claimant knew that his condition was still unstable, he could
have filed for an increase in his permanent partial award during
the statutory time frame to allow for future loss of earnings.
Id. at 1014. If the claimant did not anticipate future
disability, then he was no better off than he would be in a civil
suit where he would have been required, but unable to prove his
future damages. Id.10
In the instant case, the Petitioner is also arguing that §
35-1-99 (3)is a statute of repose, and that the statute should not
begin to run until the Petitioner knew the full extent of his
injury, i.e. that he was unable to work. Section 35-1-99(3) is a
statute of limitation because the Petitioner's cause of action
arose on the date of his industrial accident. Like the claimants
in Avis and Middlestadt, the Petitioner should not be allowed to
toll the statute of limitation because he had not "discovered"
the full extent of his injury.11 In fact, the Petitioner had

10

Regardless of the exclusive remedy provisions in workers1
compensation law, the Petitioner would not have a remedy in a
civil action because the applicable statute of limitation is four
years per Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25 (1992 & Supp. 1996).
11

The "discovery" rule is used for occupational diseases
which recognizes that the onset of the occupational disease
likely does not occur for a period of time after exposure thus
the statute of limitations is tolled until the cause of action
arises - when the employee knows of his/her occupational disease.
This is in contrast to the Petitioner who, like the claimants in
Avis and Middlestadt knew of his injury on the date of the
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discovered the full extent of his injury during the six year
statute of limitation found in § 35-1-99(3). He filed for Social
Security disability benefits on January 25, 1994, within this six
year period. The SSA determined he was disabled as of January 1,
1993 and awarded benefits back to that date. Clearly, the
Petitioner was aware of his disability within the six year
statute of limitation period. His failure to file an application
for hearing within six years bars his claim for permanent total
disability per Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99(3).

POINT IV.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S CONTINUING JURISDICTION OVER
WORKERS1 COMPENSATION CLAIMS DOES NOT GIVE IT AUTHORITY TO
MODIFY OR IGNORE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1) states that the "powers and
jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be
continuing."

However, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(3) states

(a)This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any
respect the statutes of limitations contained in other
sections of this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah
Occupational Disease Disability Law.
(b)The commission has no power to change the statutes of
limitations referred to in Subsection (a) in any respect.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(3) (1988) (subsequently amended) .12
The Petitioner argues that the Industrial Commission
"totally disregarded" § 35-1-78(1) when it dismissed his claim.

industrial accident.
12

This subsection is currently found in Utah Code Ann. §
35-1-78 (4) (1994) .
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(Petitioner's Brief, p.27.) However, the Petitioner totally
disregards § 35-1-78(3) which states that the Industrial
Commission's continuing jurisdiction over claims does not modify
statutes of limitations, and that the Industrial Commission has
no power to change statutes of limitations.

POINT V.
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE TOLLING IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY.
The doctrine of equitable tolling of a statute of limitation
is used when a plaintiff has multiple legal remedies available.
Gudenau & Co., Inc. v. Sweeney Ins., 736 P.2d 763, 768 (Alaska
1987). Courts do not require a plaintiff to pursue two separate
and duplicative remedies. Id. If the plaintiff adopts a single
course of action which is dismissed or fails, "courus generally
allow the plaintiff to pursue a second remedy based
right

or claim,

on the

same

tolling the limitations period during the

pendency of the initial defective action." Id. (emphasis added).
The Petitioner's right to social security disability
benefits and workers' compensation disability benefits are not
duplicative remedies based on the same right or claim. The rights
to social security benefits and workers' compensation benefits
are separate and distinct rights. Equitable tolling applies when
there are different legal remedies for the same right or claim.
Thus, the doctrine is not applicable to the Petitioner's case.
The Petitioner argues that the doctrine of equitable tolling
should apply because the Industrial Commission "requires an
-27-

applicant to first obtain a determination of disability from the
SSA before an application for hearing can be filed for permanent
total disability." (Petitioner's Brief, p.31) As indicated in
Point I. this assertion is incorrect. The Industrial Commission
does not require a SSA disability award before an application for
hearing can be filed. Furthermore there is no evidence the
Petitioner mistakenly believed this was the Industrial
Commission's procedure. Thus, the Petitioner was in no way
prejudiced and has no basis for asking this Court to equitably
toll the statute of limitation on his workers' compensation
permanent total disability claim.

CONCLUSION
Utah's workers' compensations laws and the Industrial
Commission's rules do not require a social security disability
award before a claim for permanent total disability can be filed.
The Industrial Commission's procedures also do not impose this
requirement. The Petitioner failed to file an application for
hearing for permanent total disability within six years of his
industrial accident, as required by the workers' compensation law
in effect at the time. The Order of the Industrial Commission
should be affirmed.

-28-

Respectfully submitted this J <T day of October, 1996

RICHARD G.

SUMSION;
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TERESA J. MARI
MARECK

Attorneys for the Respondents,
Mountainland Builders, Inc.
and Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this

2 S

day of October, 1996

two true and correct copies of the Brief of
Defendants/Respondents were hand delivered or mailed by U. S.
Mail, postage prepaid addressed as follows:
Eugene C. Miller, Jr.
Attorney for the Petitioner
40 East South Temple, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Alan Hennebold
Attorney for the Industrial Commission
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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RECEIVED
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No.

J. DAVID VIGOS,

*
*

Applicant,

95599

SEP 2 0 1995

Workers Compensafem Fund
Legal Qepartnrant

*
*

vs.

*

MOUNTAINLAND BUILDERS
INC.,and/or WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND,

*
*
*

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

*

*

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

On July 11, 1995 the applicant filed a claim for temporary
total compensation and permanent total disability benefits in the
above-entitled matter, alleging the same are the result of the
industrial accident of October 12, 1988. Thereafter, the defendant
raised the statute of limitations defense of Section 35-1-99(3),
Utah Code Annotated. Section 99 requires that a claim for weekly
compensation benefits must be filed within six (6) years of the
date of the accident or the claim is wholly barred. In this case,
the file indicates that the applicant was paid temporary total
disability by the defedants for the period October 14, 1988 to May
8, 1989. The defendants also last paid medical expenses for the
applicant's claim in July of 1989.
Herein, the applicant filed his claims more than 6 years after
the accident, namely on July 11, 1995, when the same should
have
been
filed
no
later
than
October
13,
1994.
Therefore, as a matter of law the claims for permanent total
disability and temporary total disability benefits mustrbe denied
as required by the foregoing statute, Section 99.
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good cause for
dismissing the claim,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the claim of the Applicant
for permanent total and temporary total disability benefits be, and
the same is hereby, dismissed with prejudice.

J. DAVID VIGOS
ORDER
PAGE TWO

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed this Order shall be final and not
subject to further review or appeal. In the event a Motion for
Review is timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days
from the date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b12(2), Utah Code Annotated.
DATED this 18th day of September,1995.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on September 18, 1995 a copy of the
attached ORDER OF DISMISSAL was mailed to the following persons at
the following addresses, postage paid:
J. David Vigos, 3640 Aurora Circle, SLC, UT 84124
Richard Sumsion, Atty, WCFU, P.O. 57929, SLC, UT 84157
Eugene C. Miller, Jr., Atty, 40 E. So. Temple, #300, SLC, UT
84111

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Roxanne Fowler

ADDENDUM B

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
J. DAVID VIGOS,
*
*

Applicant,
vs.

*

MOUNTAIN BUILDERS, INC.
and THE WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND OF UTAH,

*

*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

Case No. 95-0597

Defendants.

J. David Vigos asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to
review the Administrative Law Judge's dismissal of Mr. Vigos' claim
for benefits under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW
Is Mr. Vigos' claim barred by the statute of limitations found
in §35-1-98(2) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The facts material to the foregoing issue are not in dispute.
Mr. Vigos alleges an industrial injury occurring on October 12,
1988. He filed his claim for workers' compensation benefits with
the Industrial Commission on July 11, 1995.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
J. DAVID VIGOS
PAGE 2
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Since July 1 1988, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act has
required injured workers to file their claims for disability
compensation with the Commission within six years from the date of
their industrial accidents. This statute of limitations, now found
in §35-1-98(2) of the Act, provides in material part as follows:
A claim for compensation for temporary total
disability
benefits,
temporary
partial
disability
benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or
permanent total disability benefits is barred, unless an
application for hearing is filed with the commission
within six years after the date of the accident.
Under the plain language of the foregoing statute, Mr. Vigos'
claim was barred when he failed to file it with the Industrial
Commission within six years from the date of his accident. The
Industrial Commission is compelled to conclude, as did the ALJ,
that Mr. Vigos claim must be dismissed.
In reaching this conclusion, the Industrial Commission has
considered Mr. Vigos' arguments, but finds them unpersuasive. The
appellate decisions cited by Mr. Vigos were not decided under the
provisions of §35-1-98(2) and are of no value as precedent in this
case.
As to the argument that the Industrial Commission has
continuing jurisdiction over Mr. Vigos' claim, such jurisdiction
attaches only when a timely application for benefits has been
filed.
In this case, Mr. Vigos' application was untimely.
Finally, with respect to Mr. Vigos' contention that the time for
filing his workers' compensation claim was "equitably tolled" while
he pursued his right to Social Security disability compensation,
Mr. Vigos admits that this principle has not been accepted before
in Utah. The Industrial Commission declines to apply it now, since
±t is directly contrary to the provisions of §35-1-98(2).

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
J. DAVID VIGOS
PAGE 3

QRQER
The Industrial Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and
denies Mr. Vigos' motion for review. It is so ordered.
Dated thisJ^j? day of March, 1996.

NOTICE OF APPSAfr RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this
order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Industrial
Commission
within
20 days
of
the date
of , this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of
Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court within 3 0
days of the date of this order.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
J. DAVID VIGOS
PAGE 4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion
For Review in the matter of J. David Vigos, Case No. 95-0597, was
mailed first class postage prepaid this {?{X day of March, 1995, to
the following:
J. DAVID VIGOS
3 640 AURORA CIRCLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84124
EUGENE C. MILLER JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
40 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
RICHARD G. SUMSION
ATTORNEY AT LAW
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107

Adell Butler-Mitchell
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission of Utah

ORDERS\05-0597

ADDENDUM C

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Art. I, § 11

sion of operator's license for "habitual," "persistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic regulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51
A.L.R.4th 565.
Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory
discharge from employment, 52 A.L.R.4th
1141.
Right to jury trial in state court divorce proceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955.
Jury trial rights in, and on appeal from,
small claims court proceeding, 70 A.L.R.4th
1119.
Key Numbers. — Jury ®=» 9 et seq.

Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev.
319.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L.>•
Rev. 177.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 7 ett
seq.
C.J.S. -— 50 C.J.S. Juries § 9 et seq.
A.L.R. — Driving while intoxicated or simi-"1
lar offense, right to trial by jury in criminal
prosecution for, 16 A.L.R.3d 1373.
Right in equity suit to jury trial of counterclaim involving legal issue, 17 A.L.R.3d 1321.r
Issues in garnishment as triable to court or
to jury, 19 A.L.R.3d 1393.
f
Automobiles: validity and construction of
legislation authorizing revocation or suspen-

Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
History: Const. 1896.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Actions by court.
Actions by state.
Actions not created.
Arbitration Act.
Assignments.
Attorneys' duties.
Criminal law.
—Suspension of execution of death sentence.
Debt collection.
District court jurisdiction.
Election contest.
Forum non conveniens.
Injury or damage to property.
Intoxicating liquor.
Land Registration Act.
Limitations.
—Limitations of actions.
—Statutory limitation of review.
Occupational disease law.
Sovereign immunity.
Torts.
—Action by wife against husband.
—Loss of consortium.
Unlicensed law practice.
Waiver of rights.
Workmen's compensation law.
Cited.

Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1981 et
seq., is vested originally in the federal courts,
but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by
state courts is not thereby prohibited; in view
of the provisions of this section, therefore, it
was error for trial court to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d
625 (Utah 1977).
Trial court would not err in dismissing action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the
ground of forum non conveniens in a proper
case, but such dismissal should be without
prejudice so that the plaintiff might move his
suit to another forum without harm to his
claim. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah
1977).
Actions by court
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open probate proceeding and to proceed against bond of
administratrix where she has practiced extrinsic fraud on the court. Weyant v. Utah Sav. &
Trust Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.L.R.
1119 (1919).
Actions by state.
This section did not alter the law with respect to certain rights which are vested in the
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION

35-1-67

35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments.
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident,
the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a finding by the
commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt
rules that conform to the substance of the sequential decision-making process
of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520
(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312week entitlement, compensation shall be 662/3% of the employee's average
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows:
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury.
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per
week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor
children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a)
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the
injury.
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation
rate under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average
weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks
of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of
this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier
by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee.
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers'
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer
or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection
(2), the compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be
reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the
Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same
period.
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all
cases be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings have
occurred:
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(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, refer the employee to the vocational rehabilitation agency under
the State Board of Education for rehabilitation training. The commission
shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for use in the rehabilitation
and training of the employee.
(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of
Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee has
fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly
permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence,
and ends with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable
of returning to regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has
been rehabilitated or the employees rehabilitation is possible, but where
the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for
permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort
under this section.
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both
arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body
members, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability is
required in any such instance.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-67, enacted by L. ~ent substituted "$120" for "$110" in the first
1988, ch. 116, § 4.
sentence of the second paragraph.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 19S-S.
Effective Dates. — Section 2 of Laws 1985,
ch. 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67. as \~sz ch. 160 provided: "This act takes effect upon
amended by Laws 1985, ch. 160, § 1, r e l a t e approval by the governor, or the day following
to permanent total disability, effective Julv :". ^ e constitutional time limit of Article VII,
1988, and enacts the present section.
*
Sec- 8 without the governor's signature, or in
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amend- ~ e case of a veto the date of veto override.
Approved March 18, 1985.
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ANALYSIS
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Arm injuries.
Commencement of benefits.
Determination of character of disability.
Estoppel.
Eye injuries.
Findings.
Law in effect.
Maximum benefits.
Multiple injuries.
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Qualifications of panel members.
Statutory requirement that medical panel
member specialize in "treatment of the disease" was met where practice consisted of
representing businesses and teaching, even
though physician did not actually treat patients on an appointment basis Edwards
Tillery, 671 P2d 195 (Utah 1983).
Referral to panel.
T); s c r e tion
As the evidence of the causal connection beAs the evidence oi trie causal connection be
tween an employee lifting a very heavy beam
and the perforation of his ulcer w as not uncertain or highly technical, the failure to refer the
case to a medical panel was not an abuse of
discretion Champion Home Bldrs v Industrial Comm'n, 703 P 2d 306 (Utah 1985)
, x x
,
, , . .
n
Report, statements and admissions.
In a proceeding for supplemental award of
workmen s compensation for deterioration of
condit.on caused by original mjury where the
commission had appointed a medical panel to
make an independent investigation and report
for the guidance of the commission, neither
party was bound by any statement or admission made either in the report or in the testi-
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mony of the chairman of the panel, a doctor, in
support of the report Mollerup Van Lines v
Adams, 16 Utah 2d 235, 398 P 2d 882 (1965)
In proceeding by widow of deceased oil
driller to recover compensation for his death
from coronary occlusion on ground that death
was caused by inhalation of fumes while mixmg mud compound designed to flush out
clogged pipes during oil drilling operations, the
industrial commission did not have to accept
^ e m o s t probable of three theories advanced
as
P 0 S S l b l l l t i e s b y t h e P an *l Williams v IndusComm'n, 17 Utah 2d 169, 406 P 2d 707
noftt)
Supplemental award.
Supplemental award of workmen's compensation for deterioration of condition caused by
original injury was properly granted by the
commission where evidence of the medical
j appointed by the commission, showed
^ clairoant>s s u b s e q u e n t l n j u n e s h a d n o t ad.
y a n c e d d e t e n o r a t l o n o f c o n d l t l 0 n resulting
from
M,
Mo„
Van Lmeg y
«. U t a h 2 / 2 3 5 3 9 g £ 2d 8 g 2 ( 1 9 6 5 )
M
Cited m Hone v J F Shea Co, 728 P2d
1008 (Utah 1986), Greyhound Lines v Wallace, 728 P 2d 1021 (Utah 1986)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 100 C J S Workmen's Compensation § 590
A.L.R. — Workmen's compensation u c e of
medical books or treatises as independent evidence, 17 A L R 3d 993

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
<s=> 1694

35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify
award — Authority to destroy records — Interest
on award — No authority to change statutes of
limitation.
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be
continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time
modify or change its former findings and orders Records pertaining to cases
that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of total
permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section
35-1-99, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the
rate of 8% per annum from the date when each benefit payment would have
otherwise become due and payable.
(3) (a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the
statutes of limitations contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law.
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation
referred to in Subsection (a) in any respect.
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History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 83; C.L. 1917,
§ 3144; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-72; L. 1961,
ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1;
1981, ch. 287, § 5; 1988, ch. 116, § 8.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, designated the

previously undesignated two paragraphs as
Subsections (1) and (2), added Subsection (3)
and, m Subsection (1), divided the formerly undivided language into three sentences and rewrote the contents thereof

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Additional compensation
Application for rehearing
Award for permanent, partial or total disability
Award to alien dependents of deceased
Basis of modification
Changing award based on total dependency
Circumstances justifying reopening
Conditions precedent to modification
Continuing medical expenses
Discretion of commission
Finality of adjudication
General construction
Grounds or causes for change or modification
Interest
Interest on past-due benefits
—Retroactive application
Interest on settlements
Limitations on supplemental claims
Medical expenses
Notice and opportunity to be heard
Purpose of section
Record keeping
Res adjudicata
Retention of jurisdiction
Retroactive effect of order
Review on appeal
Scope and extent of continuing jurisdiction
Supplemental award
Theory of grant of further hearings
Time of application
Additional compensation.
Where stump of amputated leg failed to heal
and stump was not sufficient to permit use of
artificial leg, commission, in exercise of continuing jurisdiction, could change award and
grant employee additional compensation
Spring Canyon Coal Co v Industrial Comm'n,
60 Utah 553, 210 P 611 (1922)
Where commission, more than thirty days
after it had set aside previous award granting
compensation, upon application of claimant as
if no prior hearing were held, awarded compensation and set aside its previous award setting
aside award granting compensation, commission proceeded without jurisdiction notwithstanding its continuing jurisdiction to modify
award under this section, since it was not intended by this section that commission might
resume jurisdiction of case once regularly de-

termmed without some change or new development in injury not known to parties when previous award was made Salt Lake City v Industrial Comm'n, 61 Utah 514, 215 P 1047
(1923)
Under this section the commission may, in
exercising its continuing jurisdiction, reopen
case and award additional compensation for
change of new development in injury or disability since award, but such additional compensation may be made effective only from
date of discovery of changed condition and cannot be made retroactive to date of original
award Aetna Life Ins Co v Industrial
Comm'n, 69 Utah 102, 252 P 567 (1926)
Where original award contemplated change
in condition of employee for better, which
change did not occur after employee received
compensation for number of weeks awarded,
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Douon, 646 R2d 707 (Utah 1982).
Bfrg of Insurance report.
fagurance carriers filing of final report of
fart and statement of total losses following
^ p a y m e n t made to injured worker is reared by Industrial Commission and does not
offer any jurisdiction of the settled matter
%on the Industrial Commission; the injured
Pieman's claim was barred by this section
bare he had not attempted to invoke the
nsdiction of the Industrial Commission for
ore than three years after the last payment
u made and the commission was correct in
fusing to grant a hearing on the matter,
person v. Industrial Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 446,
LI R2d 721 (1973).
otice.
Where foreman saw accident, this section
as inapplicable. Hartford Accident & Indem.
o. v. Industrial Comm'n, 64 Utah 176, 228 P.
>3 (1924).
Where applicant lost his eye as a result of
ircoma, being hit in the eye by a handball
hile playing at the fire station and while on
ity, and lieutenant, who was in charge of the
re station at the time the injury occurred, was
aying handball with applicant at time hand-
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ball struck him in the eye, this was equivalent
of notice of accident and injury to city. Salt Lake
City v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 436, 140
P.2d 644 (1943).
Report of accident.
The report made under the authority of this
section may establish identity of employer at
time of injury. Burke v. Industrial Comm'n, 75
Utah 441, 286 P. 623 (1930) (decided under
former § 35-1-97).
These reports and supplemental reports are
made on printed blanks which are furnished to
employers. Utah Delaware Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 187, 289 P. 94 (1930)
(decided under former § 35-1-97).
Report of employer to Industrial Commission
stating that employee was injured on particular
day was insufficient to establish time and manner of accident, where shown by subsequent
investigation to have given erroneous date.
General Mills, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 99
Utah 293, 105 P.2d 340 (1940) (decided under
former § 35-1-97).
Self-employed worker is not affected by requirement that employee must notify employer
of accident and injury within one year, since
requirement is automatically fulfilled. State
Ins. Fund v. Perkes, 672 P.2d 101 (Utah 1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 100 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensaon § 454.

5-1-98. Claims and benefits.
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disabily cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if the employee does
ot incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident, and
iibmit those expenses to his employer or insurance carrier for payment, for a
eriod of three consecutive years.
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, tempoary partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or
ermanent total disability benefits is barred, unless an application for hearing
\ filed with the commission within six years after the date of the accident.
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application for hearing is
led within one year of the date of death of the employee.
History: C. 1953, 35-1-98, enacted by L.
990, ch. 69, § 6.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
990, ch. 69, § 6 repeals former § 35-1-98, as

last amended by Laws 1967, ch. 66, § 2, relating to control of physicians, and enacts the
present section, effective April 23, 1990.
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Form of report.
The attending physician makes his report on
a printed blank furnished for that purpose in

35-1-99

which he describes the injury. Utah Delaware
Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 76 Utah 187,
289 P. 94 (1930).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 266.

Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation
«=» 979.

35-1-99. Notice of injury and claim for compensation —
Limitations of action.
(1) If an employee claiming to have suffered an industrial accident in the
service of his employer fails to give written notice within 180 calendar days to
his employer or the commission of the time and place where the accident and
injury occurred, and of the nature of the accident and injury, the employee's
claim for benefits under this chapter is wholly barred. If, for any reason, an
employee is himself unable to provide this written notice, the employee's nextof-kin or attorney may file it within the required 180-day period. Receipt of
written notice is presumed if the employer complies with the terms of Section
35-1-97 by filing with the commission an accident report, or if the employer or
its insurance carrier pays disability or medical benefits to or on behalf of the
injured employee.
(2) In nonpermanent total disability cases, an employee's medical benefit
entitlement, except with respect to prosthetic devices, ceases if the employee
does not incur, and submit to his employer or insurance carrier for payment,
for a period of three consecutive years, medical expenses reasonably related to
the industrial accident.
(3) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an application for
hearing is filed with the industrial commission within six years after the date
of the accident.
(4) A claim for death benefits is wholly barred, unless an application for
hearing is filed within one year of the date of death of the employee.
History: C.L. 1917, § 3156x, added by L.
1921, ch. 67,1; R.S. 1933,42-1-92; L. 1939, ch.
51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-92; L. 1981, ch. 287, § 6;
1986, ch. 211, § 11; 1988, ch. 116, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective July 1, 1986, in the first sentence, substituted "accident and injury" for
"same", substituted "in the notice subjects" for
"therein shall subject" and made minor word
changes; made stylistic changes in the second
sentence; divided the former third sentence
into three sentences and made stylistic
changes therein; and, in the fourth sentence,
deleted "industrial commission and" before
"employee" and made minor word changes.
The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988,
designated the previously undesignated language as Subsection (1), added Subsections (2)
through (4) and, in Subsection (1), substituted

the present second and third sentences for the
former last four sentences, relating to the same
subject matter, and, in the first sentence, deleted the proviso clause at the end, relating to
knowledge being equivalent to notice and to
defect or inaccuracies in the notice, and, in the
remaining language, substituted "If an employee claiming to have suffered an industrial
accident in the service of his employer fails to
give written notice within 180 calendar days to
his employer or the commission" for "When an
employee claiming to have suffered an injury
in the service of his employer fails to give notice to his employer" and "the employee's claim
for benefits under this chapter is wholly
barred" for "within 48 hours, when possible, or
fails to report for medical treatment within
that time, the compensation provided for herein shall be reduced 15%."
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F. The Commission shall suggest a format for use by parties desirous of settling claims
of doubtful compensability.
R568-1-17. Permanent Total Disability.
A. The Commission is required under Section 35-1-67, U.C.A., to make a finding of
total disability as measured by the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the
Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations, amended April
1, 1993. The use of the term "substance of the sequential decision-making process" is deemed
to confer some latitude on the Commission in exercising a degree of discretion in making its
findings relative to permanent total disability. The Commission does not interpret the code
section to eliminate the requirement that a finding by the Commission in permanent and total
disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until rehabilitation training and/or evaluation
has been accomplished.
B. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its designee has made, or is
in the process of making, a determination of disability under the foregoing process, the
Commission may use this information in lieu of instituting the process on its own behalf.
C. In evaluating industrial claims in which the injured worker has qualified for Social
Security disability benefits, the Commission will determine if a significant cause of the disability
is the claimant's industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or causes.
D. To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability the Commission incorporates
the rules of disability determination in 20 CFR 404.1520, amended April 1, 1993. The
sequential decision making process referred to requires a series of questions and evaluations to
be made in sequence. In short, these are:
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity?
2. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment?
3. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the duration requirement in 20 CFR
404.1509, amended April 1, 1993, and the listed impairments in 20 CFR Subpart P Appendix
1, amended April 1, 1993?
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work?
5. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing any other work?
E. After a tentative finding of permanent total disability, the applicant shall be referred
to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation for evaluation and rehabilitation work-up. If the Utah
State Office of Rehabilitation determines that the applicant is unable to do any other work
because of his age, education, and previous work experience, and as a result of an industrial
accident, there shall be a hearing to review the determination of the Utah State Office of
Rehabilitation and any objections thereto, unless the parties waive the right to a hearing.
F. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the parties, the Commission shall issue
an order finding or denying permanent total disability based upon the preponderance of the
evidence and with due consideration of the vocational factors in combination with the residual
functional capacity which the commission incorporates as published in 20 CFR 404 Subpart P
Appendix 2, amended April 1, 1993.
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